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Here are some potential questions that you may be asked in a job interview for a Python Flask developer:
Can you explain what Flask is and how it is used in web development? How do you structure a Flask application? Can you demonstrate how to create a route and handle HTTP requests in Flask? How do you integrate a database with a Flask app, and how do you perform database operations such as querying and updating data? Can you describe how to secure a Flask app and prevent common web vulnerabilities such as cross-site scripting and SQL injection attacks? Have you used any Flask extensions, and if so, which ones and for what purposes? Can you give an example of how to implement user authentication and authorization in a Flask app? Have you worked with template engines in Flask, and if so, which ones and for what purposes? Can you describe how to test a Flask app, including unit tests and integration tests? Can you discuss any challenges you have faced while working with Flask, and how you resolved them?
The cost of a mortgage for a property that is being purchased for self-occupation and a property that is being purchased as a buy-to-let investment can differ in a few ways. One key difference is the interest rate that the lender offers. In general, interest rates for mortgages on properties that are being purchased for self-occupation are lower than those for buy-to-let properties. This is because lenders view self-occupied properties as having a lower risk of default, and therefore are willing to offer lower interest rates.
Another key difference between the cost of a mortgage for a self-occupied property and a buy-to-let property is the type of mortgage that is available. For self-occupied properties, borrowers typically have a choice between fixed-rate and variable-rate mortgages, while buy-to-let mortgages are often only available as variable-rate loans. The terms and conditions of these mortgages can also differ, with buy-to-let mortgages often requiring a larger down payment and having stricter eligibility requirements.
Overall, the cost of a mortgage for a self-occupied property is typically lower than the cost of a mortgage for a buy-to-let property, due to the lower interest rates and more favorable terms and conditions that are available for self-occupied properties. However, the exact cost will depend on a number of factors, including the borrower's credit history and the lender's specific terms and conditions.
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Top tips for your job interviewInterview: MELITA CAMERON-WOOD MEDIUM AUDIO
Business Spotlight 23/11/2022 Angst vor dem Vorstellungsgespräch? Mit diesen Tipps gehört die Furcht der Vergangenheit an.
Top tips for your job interview
Job interviews are nerve-racking, but applicants have more control than they may think. Here are ten tips to make the most of your time in the hot seat:
Rather than taking a subservient position, speak to the interviewer as an equal. Respect, directness and politeness can all go hand in hand.
Start with the end in mind. What do you want the outcome to be? What do you want to learn from the interviewer? State your expectations from the beginning.
Don’t just describe past experiences. It’s more engaging to talk about your current role and transferrable skills.
Ask where the interviewer wants you to begin. Listen carefully. Identify areas of interest rather than just saying what’s on your CV. I’ve seen candidates go through 42-slide Powerpoint presentations as a means of introduction. That’s not good.
Get feedback. Check in with the interviewer on a regular basis and ask for their views on what you’ve told them. Then you can give targeted responses.
Don’t leave important questions until the end. You might not have enough time, so clarify what you want to know early on. You worked hard to get this interview, so make it count.
Give the interviewer permission to interrupt you if they want to change the topic, but also remember your own right to interrupt them if you feel the job is not right for you. Your time is just as important as the interviewer’s.
Bring up money. If the job advert said “salary competitive”, find out at the start if the details will be discussed in the interview or at a later time. If the interviewer asks you what your ideal compensation would be, throw the question back at them and ask what budget has been approved for the role.
Ask when you can expect to hear back. What happens next? Simple, direct questions may save you a lot of anxiety.
Keep post-interview emails short. Refer back to the conversation you had rather than introducing new information. In-person interaction will secure the deal, not an email.
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19/11/2022
Mick jagger is the best-known alumnus of Dartford Grammar, a secondary school in Kent. Yet the front-man of the Rolling Stones is not its only claim to fame. Dartford is among a tiny bunch of English state schools that decline to enter sixthform students for A-levels. Instead pupils follow courses set by International Baccalaureate, an exam board headquartered in Switzerland. They study six subjects, when most of their peers usually take only three; these must include maths, English and a foreign language. “We’re not just preparing students for university,” says Julian Metcalf, the head teacher, “but for another 60 years of life beyond that.”
Every few years England’s A-level system comes in for a kicking. Britain’s prime minister is the latest person to give it. Campaigning to lead the Tories in August, Rishi Sunak warned that England was unusual among rich countries in letting youngsters drop maths and their native language at 16. He proposed swapping the present system for a new “British Baccalaureate” that would require pupils to keep up both of those subjects until they are 18. There is no chance of this happening in the two years before Britain’s next election. But Mr Sunak may be thinking of writing such a reform into his party’s manifesto.
Even critics agree that A-levels are, in themselves, rigorous and demanding qualifications, and that they enjoy great prestige abroad. Britain’s universities have traditionally been pickier than those in many other countries. Ambitious sixth-formers have generally been grateful that they are allowed to sweat only the subjects they need for admission. Focused graft in the final years of secondary school helps explain why most students in England can earn bachelor’s degrees in three years, when those in many other countries study for at least four.
Yet A-levels may not be handing English teenagers the breadth of skills they need. Their performance in literacy and numeracy tests falls behind those in most other rich countries after they turn 16. Onethird of 16- to 19-year-olds in England have “low basic skills”, reckon analysts from the oecd, a club of mostly-rich countries. One in ten university students cannot pass basic tests in maths or comprehension.
There is enough time in the school day to offer extra maths and English classes without greatly crimping other studies. But it would cost money. For no good reason, England’s schools get less funding for pupils aged 16-19 than they do for younger children. Broadening studies would also require more staff. The number of people who began training to be a secondaryschool teacher this September was about one-third lower than hoped, the biggest such shortfall in years. Maths teachers are in particularly short supply.
Shaking things up could involve more than academics. Pupils who do the International Baccalaureate (ib) must not only pass exams but also complete some kind of community service. For many of the IB’s boosters, this is a big part of its appeal. Some argue that a “British Baccalaureate” should mix subjects from academic and vocational paths, which at present are kept far apart. Whatever happens, it will probably give no one complete satisfaction.
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Indonesia Why it mattersThe Economist (UK) 19/11/2022
This week’s g20 meeting took place in Indonesia, the most important country that people routinely overlook. The last time its economy and politics were in the global spotlight was during the mayhem of the 1990s when a crony-capitalist system collapsed amid the Asian financial crisis, causing the fall of the 32-year-long dictatorship of Suharto.
A quarter of a century on, Indonesia matters once again. It is the world’s largest Muslim-majority state, its third-biggest democracy and its fourth-most-populous country. With 276m people spread across thousands of islands that stretch from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, it is caught up in the strategic contest between America and China. And like India and other emerging markets, it is adapting to a new world order in which globalisation and Western supremacy are in retreat.
Over the next quarter-century, the country’s clout could increase spectacularly. The economy is one reason. Indonesia is the sixth-biggest emerging market by gdp, and in the past decade has grown faster than any other $1trn-plus economy bar China and India. A source of dynamism is digital services, which are helping create a more integrated consumer market, with over 100m people collectively spending $80bn a year on everything from e-payments to apps for on-demand trucking.
Another economic catalyst is Indonesia-specific. With a fifth of global reserves of nickel, used in batteries, the country is a vital link in electric-vehicle (ev) supply chains. As the West, China and India increase subsidies to attract ev investment at home, Indonesia has spotted an opportunity. Rather than seeking to be the Saudi Arabia of the green-metal age, it is pursuing a policy of “downstreaming”, banning the export of raw materials to force global firms to build factories in Indonesia. This is unorthodox, but over $20bn of investment has been secured so far. Coal-fired power stations are being retired early, pushing these new industries to run on clean power.
The second reason for Indonesia’s strong prospects is that it has found a way to combine democracy with economic reform. Reflecting the traumas of the 1990s, a flawed but pluralist political system has developed that emphasises compromise and social harmony. Joko Widodo, the deceptively laid-back president since 2014, rules through a sprawling coalition which has coopted many of his opponents. You might think this would lead to lowest-common-denominator policies. But the public finances are tightly run. Incremental improvements include new infrastructure, the cleaning up of state firms and some modernisation of education and labour laws. Corruption is a problem, but the economy is more open than it was ten years ago.
The final reason for Indonesia’s growing clout is geopolitics. Its location, size and resources make it a key theatre in the superpower contest. Reflecting a tradition of non-alignment that goes back to the 1950s, it wants to be neutral. It solicits capital from both sides of the divide, and is an arena in which Chinese and American digital firms and investors compete directly. In batteries catl, the Chinese champion, is investing in a $6bn project, but Jokowi, as the president is known, is also wooing Tesla. In diplomacy he has sought to be a convener and peacemaker. Indonesia has criticised Western sanctions on Russia. Jokowi may be the only person to have met presidents Joe Biden, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky this year.
If Indonesia stays on this path for the next decade, the country could become one of the world’s ten biggest economies. It would remain fairly resilient against shocks: its currency has outperformed several rich-world peers this year despite global financial turmoil. Living standards would rise: only 4% of people now live on $2.15 a day or less, three-quarters less than in 2012. Although Indonesia is unlikely to become a Chinese-style manufacturing miracle, a big middle class would emerge.
Inevitably, there are dangers. One is succession. Jokowi’s final term ends in 2024 and he has no obvious successor. Some supporters want him to fiddle the constitution to remain in power. The succession could become a competition to appeal to devout voters by espousing chauvinist Muslim policies. Alternatively, the business figures and political clans who form part of Jokowi’s coalition could win power and lead a slide back to oligarchic rule. He has built plenty of roads and airports, but Jokowi has not strengthened the institutions that can guarantee continuity after he has left office.
Protectionism is another risk. The country has a long history of prickly resource nationalism. Downstreaming may work in nickel, in which Indonesia has market power, but backfire in other industries. Indonesia has yet to attract Apple’s supply chain as it shifts from China to other parts of Asia, in part because its labour market is still too rigid. If Indonesia pushes too hard, ev firms will try to find substitutes for its green metals.
The biggest danger is that geopolitics causes Indonesia to stumble. Even on its current path, it could drift into China’s orbit. For every dollar American firms have invested in Indonesia since 2020, Chinese firms have deployed nearly four. If tensions escalated, the costs would be high. A war over Taiwan could block the sea-lanes upon which Indonesia relies, while Western sanctions might strike Chinese firms that Indonesia depends on. Jokowi’s diplomacy is humoured by Mr Biden and Mr Xi but so far the world’s non-aligned countries, including most members of the asean South-East Asian group, are too diffuse to have much influence on the superpowers.
Growing up in a zero-sum world
India and Indonesia are the bright stars of Asia. Both must satisfy electorates at home and find a way to grow, even as globalisation is in retreat. India is opting for tech- and manufacturing-led development, fuelled by subsidies, chauvinistic politics and decoupling from China. Indonesia is relying on resources, surgical protectionism, big-tent politics and neutrality. Both are giant bets. The superpowers will be watching closely—as will many other countries that want to get richer but would prefer not to pick sides. If it succeeds, Indonesia will improve the lives of a quarter of a billion people and spur on a growth-starved world. It could even alter the global balance of power.
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After ftx Crypto’s downfallThe Economist (UK) 19/11/2022
The fall from grace was hard and fast. Only a fortnight ago Sam Bankman-Fried was in the stratosphere. ftx, his cryptocurrency exchange, then the third-largest, was valued at $32bn; his own wealth was estimated at $16bn. To the gushing venture capitalists (vcs) of Silicon Valley he was the financial genius who could wow investors while playing video games, destined, perhaps, to become the world’s first trillionaire. In Washington he was the acceptable face of crypto, communing with lawmakers and bankrolling efforts to influence its regulation.
Today there is nothing left but 1m furious creditors, dozens of shaky crypto firms and a proliferation of regulatory and criminal probes. The high-speed implosion of ftx has dealt a catastrophic blow to an industry with a history of failure and scandals. Never before has crypto looked so criminal, wasteful and useless.
The more that comes out about the demise of ftx, the more shocking the tale becomes. The exchange’s own terms of service said it would not lend customers’ assets to its trading arm. Yet of $14bn of such assets, it had reportedly lent $8bn-worth to Alameda Research, a trading firm also owned by Mr BankmanFried. In turn, it accepted as collateral its own digital tokens, which it had conjured out of thin air. A fatal run on the exchange exposed the gaping hole in its balance-sheet. To cap it all, after FTX declared bankruptcy in America, hundreds of millions of dollars mysteriously flowed out of its accounts.
Big personalities, incestuous loans, overnight collapses—these are the stuff of classic financial manias, from tulip fever in 17th-century Holland to the South Sea Bubble in 18th-century Britain to America’s banking crises in the early 1900s. At its peak last year, the market value of all cryptocurrencies surged to the giddy height of almost $3trn, up from nearly $800bn at the start of 2021. Today it is back at $830bn (see back Briefing).
As at the end of any mania, the question now is whether crypto can ever be useful for anything other than scams and speculation. The promise was of a technology that could make financial intermediation faster, cheaper and more efficient. Each new scandal that erupts makes it more likely that genuine innovators will be frightened off and the industry will dwindle. Yet a chance remains, diminishing though it is, that some lasting innovation will one day emerge. As crypto falls to Earth, that slim chance should be kept alive.
Amid the wreckage of the past week, it is worth remembering the technology’s underlying potential. Conventional banking requires a vast infrastructure to maintain trust between strangers. This is expensive and is often captured by insiders who take a cut. Public blockchains, by contrast, are built on a network of computers, making their transactions transparent and, in theory, trustworthy. Interoperable, open-source functions can be built on top of them, including self-executing smart contracts that are guaranteed to function as written. A system of tokens, and rules governing them, can collectively offer a clever way to incentivise open-source contributors. And arrangements that would be expensive or impractical to enforce in the real world become possible—allowing artists to retain a stake in the profits from the resale of their digital works, for instance.
The disappointment is that, 14 years after the Bitcoin blockchain was invented, little of this promise has been realised. Crypto’s frenzy drew in talent from bright graduates to Wall Street professionals, and capital from vc firms, sovereignwealth and pension funds. Vast quantities of money, time, talent and energy have been used to build what amount to virtual casinos. Efficient, decentralised versions of mainstream financial functions, such as currency exchanges and lending, exist. But many consumers, fearful of losing their money, do not trust them. Instead they are used to speculate on unstable tokens. Money-launderers, sanctions-dodgers and scammers abound.
Presented with all this, a sceptic might say that now is the time to regulate the industry out of existence. But a capitalist society should allow investors to take risks in the knowledge that they will make losses if their bets go sour. Even as crypto has imploded, the spillovers to the wider financial system have been manageable. ftx’s backers included Sequoia, a Californian vc firm; Temasek, a Singaporean sovereign-wealth fund; and the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (see Business section). All have lost money, but none catastrophically.
Moreover, sceptics should acknowledge that nobody can predict which innovations will bear fruit and which will not. People should be free to devote time and money to fusion power, airships, the metaverse and a host of other technologies that may never come good. Crypto is no different. As the virtual economy develops, useful decentralised applications may yet appear—who knows? The underlying technology continues to improve. An upgrade to Ethereum’s blockchain in September radically reduced its energy consumption, paving the way for it to handle high transaction volumes efficiently.
Instead of over-regulating or stamping out crypto, regulators should be guided by two principles. One is to ensure that theft and fraud are minimised, as with any financial activity. The other is to keep the mainstream financial system insulated from further crypto-ructions. Although blockchains were explicitly designed to escape regulation, these principles justify regulating the institutions that act as gatekeepers for the cryptosphere. Requiring exchanges to back customer deposits with liquid assets is an obvious step. A second is disclosure rules that reveal if, say, a gargantuan and dubiously collateralised loan has been made to the exchange’s own trading arm. Stablecoins, which are meant to hold their value in real-world currency, should be regulated as if they were payment instruments at banks.
Tulip bulb or light bulb?
Whether crypto survives, or becomes a financial curiosity like the tulip bulb, will not ultimately depend on regulation. The more scandals ensue, the more the whole enterprise and its aspirations become tainted. The lure of innovation means nothing if investors and users fear their money will disappear into thin air. For crypto to rise again, it must find a valid use that leaves the dodginess behind.
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Bagehot EmigrationThe Economist (UK) 03/12/2022
Adverts on TalkSport, a radio station that does what it says on the tin, reveal the state of the nation. McDonald’s advertises for workers in Britain’s tight labour market. Santander, a bank, warns against falling victim to fraud, which is rife. Amid it all, the government desperately reminds listeners that it has already knocked £400 ($480) off their energy bills.
But every 15 minutes the listener is treated to an alternative. “Build a life in Western Australia,” blares out a man with a questionable Aussie accent. “Find the work and lifestyle you want in Western Australia.” White Van Man is implored to ditch Britain and head 9,000 miles (14,500km) south-east for a new life in Perth, which has sunshine and jobs galore in construction and manufacturing. It is, says the jobbing actor, “the lifestyle you deserve”.
Migration policy in Britain is framed almost entirely by people arriving. More attention should be paid to those on the way out. In the year to June 2022, over 1m people entered Britain. But people come and go. About 560,000 left the country in the same period, as immigrants returned home to the eu and beyond, and Britons took a punt on starting a new life elsewhere. Unless things improve, many more will follow.
Historically, Britain is a country of emigration rather than immigration. During the 19th century only Ireland, Italy and Norway exported people at a higher rate. The history of those who arrived from the Caribbean on hmt Empire Windrush in 1948 is well known. The tales of the millions of Britons who boarded the ss Canberra and other ocean liners for a new life in Australia and beyond is overlooked, argues David Edgerton, a historian. Britain only became a country of predominantly net immigration in 1983.
When emigration last haunted politicians, Britain was in a rut. In 1974 Jim Callaghan, then the foreign secretary and a future prime minister, joked: “Sometimes when I go to bed at night, I think that if I were a young man I would emigrate.” After all, Britain was a country with stagnant growth, high inflation, high taxes, an energy crisis and a state in dramatic need of overhaul.
The circumstances that had Callaghan dreaming of life elsewhere then are similar to today’s. Young, potentially mobile workers have it hardest. Graduate-trainee salaries have fallen by 22% in real terms since 2010, according to High Fliers, a graduate-recruitment research agency. An uneven tax system whacks thrusting youngsters. Overall the British state has a smaller tax take than its European neighbours. But those on a typical professional salary with a student loan face marginal rates (41%) similar to those in continental Europe and higher than in Australia and Canada.
People leave when opportunity lies elsewhere. The realisation that Britain is not, by north European standards, a rich country is entering the country’s bloodstream. British gdp per person is now below countries it used to rival, whether Germany, Australia or Canada. Britain’s comparison country is increasingly Italy, a country where it is the norm for young people to leave, rather than an exception. In a few years’ time the point of comparison may be Poland, which thanks to tearaway growth, is always gagging for workers. In the 1980s “Auf Wiedersehen, Pet”, a TV comedy about a group of Geordie builders working in Germany, became a hit. A 2030 remake might be titled “Do Widzenia, Pet”.
For now, the last ones in are the first ones out. A net influx of eu citizens has turned into an exodus. Fanny, a 25-year-old Frenchwoman who graduated from the London School of Economics in 2020, is one. Of the roughly 20 French students on her course, she was one of only two to stick around. Now she too is departing, after taking a job in Marseille. Her salary will be the same in net terms but instead of paying for a room in a dingy flatshare in east London, it will stretch to a one-bed flat. If a job in London, where British salaries are highest, requires living in a flat-share until your 30s no wonder people consider going elsewhere.
Those with the easiest path of departure are the most likely to take it. Doctors possess a golden ticket: few countries turn them away. Given wages have dropped by 10% in real terms since 2010 and working conditions are worsening, it is little surprise that many doctors leave. Half of the 10,000 doctors who stopped practising in 2021 intended to go abroad (about 120,000 doctors work in the NHS in England). One in three doctors trained in Britain go on to leave the country, according to a survey by the General Medical Council. Britain has become a temperate Philippines, churning out health-care workers who head elsewhere.
The emigrant song
At this point in the political and economic cycle, all sides are fed up. Labourites despair; Europhiles seethe that their life’s work has been smashed up; Brexiteers moan that the country is closer to London-sur-Seine than Singapore-on-Thames. Meanwhile, a recession looms. It is natural for people to think of leaving. But talk about a new life abroad is often just that. Actually doing it is tricky. Visas must be obtained, job offers secured, flights booked, bureaucracies navigated, homes found and friends made. The history of migration is the history of the vast majority of people staying put.
Yet emigration from Britain slowed only when destination countries such as Australia tightened their immigration policies. Now, after years of lockdowns, gaps in labour markets have become canyons and the likes of Australia and Canada are gagging for arrivals, as TalkSport listeners can attest. When immigration to Britain hits 1m, the government panics. When Canada reached the same relative rate this year, its government boasted.
Things in Britain can improve. But if not, leaving is once again an option. In 1978, a year before she defeated Callaghan in an election, Margaret Thatcher told a dining companion about her plans if she did not win: “We’ll always stay…but we’ll work very hard with the children to set them up with careers in Canada.” Emigration has long been a British solution to British malaise.
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03/12/2022
CHINA INVENTED covid-19 lockdowns. During the first weeks of the pandemic, the government of Xi Jinping corralled tens of millions of people to stop the disease spreading out of Wuhan. Almost three years later, lockdowns have become China’s undoing. A combination of protests and rising cases means that Mr Xi will have to navigate between mass lockdowns and mass infection—and possibly end up with both. The coming months will pose the biggest threat to his rule since he came to power in 2012 and the biggest threat to the authority of the Communist Party since the protests around Tiananmen Square in 1989.
Sporadic local pickets are common in China. But demonstrations erupted across the country after at least ten people died in a fire in Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang, where residents were allegedly sealed in a building because of covid. Last weekend in Beijing protesters called for “freedom”; in Shanghai they demanded that Mr Xi step down. The crowds were small, but in a place as heavily policed as China it is remarkable they ever formed.
If demonstrators were the only opposition, the security forces could restore order. But Mr Xi also faces an implacable virus. To grasp the political and economic turmoil that lies ahead, you need first to understand how China’s epidemic has gone wrong.
One problem is hubris. The zero-covid policy started as a stunning success, by sparing millions of Chinese lives. At first, less disease also meant less economic harm.
For the past three years, most Chinese have got on with things. Month after month, state media trumpeted that this proves Mr Xi and the party are competent and humane, unlike decadent Western politicians presiding over mass death.
These words have now turned to ash. Mr Xi’s policies have left China ill-protected against an endemic virus that is becoming harder to control. Almost 90% of the population has had two jabs. But our modelling, based on predictions of the rate at which people become infected and recover or die, suggests that, if the virus spread unencumbered, infections would peak at 45m a day (see Briefing). Around 680,000 people would die, even if vaccines remained potent and all of them received care. In reality vaccines wane and many would go untreated. The need for intensive-care beds would reach 410,000, almost seven times China’s capacity.
Many of these fatalities would be the result of Mr Xi’s policy. Only 40% of the over-80s have had three covid shots, needed to prevent serious disease and death. Because a healthy 80-yearold is over 100 times more likely to die from covid than a healthy 20-year-old, that is a catastrophic mistake. The party is willing to lock down millions for weeks on end, but it has failed to deal with vaccine scepticism among the elderly. The government initially licensed vaccines for the under-60s only. It cast doubt on the safety of foreign vaccines while promoting traditional medicine. And it failed to incentivise local officials to put jabs first.
Unless China changes course, its resilience to covid will fade. The latest subvariants are more infectious than Omicron, which is more infectious than Delta. Protection from serious disease and death decays much faster in those who have only been vaccinated than it does in those who have been infected as well. Regardless,
China has not yet staged a campaign for a fourth shot. If booster coverage were 90% and 90% of cases had the best antiviral treatment, our model says that deaths would fall to 68,000, even if the virus were free to spread.
In a world with plenty of vaccines and antivirals, the benefits of Mr Xi’s zero-covid policy are no longer accruing, even as the economic and social costs continue to mount. The number of domestic flights in China is down by 45% year on year, road freight is 33% lower and traffic on city metros has fallen by 32%. Urban youth unemployment is almost 18%, nearly double what it was in 2018. In contrast with the last peak of infections in the spring, restrictions are currently in place in all the big cities. Some places have been locked down on and off for months. Little wonder people have taken to the streets.
And so Mr Xi faces a dilemma: to keep the disease in check has become socially and economically costly, but to lighten the burden risks causing an epidemic. Worse, the stable middle ground between runaway disease and intolerable lockdowns appears to be shrinking, if it exists at all. On November 19th, barely a week after the government tried to ease up by announcing 20 less stringent control measures, Gavekal, a research group that tracks China city by city, detected a sharp increase in restrictions as infections took hold across the country.
The implications go wider than covid (see China section). By making the zero-covid policy into a test of loyalty, Mr Xi has turned a health crisis into a political one. By imposing the daily apparatus of detection and enforcement, he has cut against the idea that his covid policy puts “people first” and instead brought an unbending authoritarian state into every home. By sticking with zero-covid despite the effects on the economy, he has cast doubt on one of the party’s chief claims to power—that only it can guarantee stability and prosperity.
This test of Mr Xi’s leadership comes at a bad time. Winter is when respiratory diseases like covid spread most easily. As Chinese viewers of the World Cup noticed before the censors got to work, they are locked down when other countries are free and maskless. As the world looks on, the failure of zero-covid is not only a life-threatening error, but also an embarrassment.
Mr Xi has no easy path out of the epidemic. The party has rightly said it will strive to vaccinate the elderly. But administering the vaccine and procuring antivirals could take months. Lockdowns will be harsh and even then the disease may break out. In the best scenario China will experience an exit wave of deaths and disease, and economic disruption.
How Mr Xi handles these trade-offs will define him. Nobody knows how much Chinese people blame him and the central government for what has gone wrong, or whether the system of surveillance and control that the party has laboured to create is able to withstand mass dissent. And nobody can be sure how much China’s increasing nationalism ensures loyalty towards the Communist Party. During his first ten years in power Mr Xi exerted increasing control over politics and the economy without paying a price. Covid throws all of that into doubt. ■
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通過新聞連接世界
愛因斯坦一直認為上帝不擲骰子，但是霍金卻說上帝不但擲骰子，他還把骰子擲到我們看不到的地方去。
這種駭人的現象，美國物理學家大衛·玻姆提出了一個獨特的想法：
「這意味著我們這個物質世界並不存在，雖然宇宙看起來很真實，其實它只是一個投影假象，是一張巨大的二維「全像宇宙投影」相片！」
一、真實宇宙是在另一個空間的精神（能量）世界。
二、物質世界是精神世界的投影！
三、物質是能量的載體與投影。
四、意識是儲存在精神世界裡。
總結就是：
一、世界是心靈的投影。
二、眼前都是虛幻的一時表象，真實資訊是在黑洞裡，而黑洞就是 心。
三、你的世界只有你自己，其他都是影像，陪你成長而已。
https://www.businesstoday.com.tw/article/category/80407/post/201902220019/